Future Perspectives
In terms of future perspectives , the following can be said about Pakistan’s missile build-up:
* Pakistan’s missile force would form the main delivery system for its nuclear weapons.
* Pakistan’s emphasis on a "credible minimum deterrent" would call for matching responses to India’s missile developments in terms of ranges and payloads. This would imply that the GHAURI and SHAHEEN series would receive priorities in terms of range and payload modifications.
* Pakistani SRBMs and MRBMs priorities would be more to build up numbers to withstand both conventional and nuclear attrition.
* In terms of ICBM capability, Pakistan would definitely aspire for it, but a host of factors are stacked against them. Even China, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missiles benefactor would hesitate to impart ICBM capability to Pakistan, for strategic reasons.
Despite the dismal state of Pakistan’s economy, her nuclear weapons and missiles build-up programmes have never stood impeded. China for strategic reasons and oil-rich Middle East countries for Islamic solidarity reasons have provided the wherewithal and finances. Substantial amounts of drug money also stands ploughed into these programmes by the Pakistani military.
In terms of future perspectives, it can be said that Pakistan’s missile build-up would continue unabated.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s missile build-up all along has been India-centric. Unlike India, which has to take the China threat into consideration, Pakistan has the luxury to focus its entire missile build-up on Indian developments.
Strategically, Pakistan has today not only offset India’s overwhelming conventional military superiority by its nuclear weaponisation but also acquired a missile force which in terms of speed of acquisition outstrips India’s pace of development of missiles. China prominently and DPRK by proxy have significantly contributed to Pakistan’s missile build-up. China has even provided a complete plant in 1995 to produce M-11 nuclear capable M-11 missiles and their variants in Pakistan.
India has no political or military options to limit Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation and missile build-up. Pakistan can only be limited by India imposing an economically unaffordable counter-buildup in these fields- uneconomical for Pakistan and its benefactors too, thats exactly what they are trying to do with pakistan. Needless to say that this is an imperative if peace and stability have to prevail in South Asia, because india will have to stop going ahead in missile and weapons of mass destruction program. If india doesnt stop, it will be necessary for pakistan to keep upgrading this stuff to be careful of indian aggressivness.
Friday, June 11, 2010
MISSILE TARGETING STRATEGY AND MISSILE ARSENAL part1
PAKISTAN,S MISSILE TARGETING STRATEGY.
Pakistani missile targeting strategies can be analysed from the following groupings in terms of ranges and characteristics. From a deductive analysis, the targeting strategy in terms of the different series appears to be as under. (See Map)
PAKISTAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE ARSENAL:
Development and Acquisition Philosophy.
The decade of the 1990s witnessed the dramatic emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation programme that had begun in 1960's because of the indian aquisition of weapons of mass destruction. It would have been logical to expect that a missile delivery programme for its nuclear weapons would be conducted concurrently. However, the outlines of an integrated Pakistani missile development plan began to appear only in the 1980s, though experimentation with sound ranging rockets had begun in the earlier decade.
Pakistan’s missile programme is termed as dramatic because in a short span commencing in 1991 this country has demonstrated the development of a long range potent missile arsenal with nuclear warhead capabilities.
Strategically, at the turn of the millennium, Pakistan can justifiably boast that not only has it offset India’s overwhelming conventional superiority by its nuclear weaponisation , but also has outstripped India’s missile development programmes which have proceeded slowly both due to domestic and external restraints.
Pakistan Missile Development /Acquisition Programme - The Stimulus
Multiple stimuli existed for Pakistan to go into over-drive for an accelerated missile development and acquisition programme. The decade of the 1990's could better be termed as a ‘Pakistan missile acquisition decade’ rather than a development one. There were more acquisitions than development.
Pakistan was impelled by the following stimuli, when contemporary developments are analysed:
* Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability by 1987, but its only means of delivery were aircraft, basically the US-F16s.
* United States embargo on F-16 deliveries as a result of Pressler Amendment rendered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability vulnerable.
* Ballistic missiles had emerged as more potently destructive weapons and cost-effective options by 1990-91. This was evident from the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan and the Gulf War.
* China, by, now had emerged as a source of ready supply of ballistic missiles for the Islamic world.
* Pakistan’s strategic nexus with China enabled an easy and assured access for build-up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal as it was for Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation.
The stage was thus propitiously set for build -up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal. Unlike its struggle to acquire wherewithal for nuclear weapons production, Pakistan faced no problem in missile acquisition or production.
Pakistan’s Missile Development and Acquisition Philosophy
Strategically, Pakistan was aware that in terms of a missile build-up, it was running against time. Pakistan had nuclear weapons, but with aircraft delivery capability only. Aircraft had limitations both in terms of range of delivery of nuclear weapons and so also penetration of India’s air-defence systems. Pakistan was also sensitive to the indigenous development of India’s integrated missile development programme. India’s programme was slow but potent and threatening for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s missile build-up philosophy, therefore, differed markedly from India’s. Analysis of events, indicate that Pakistan’s missile build-up philosophy was grounded on the following guidelines:
* Speed was the uppermost imperative in terms of build-up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal
* Direct off- the- shelf acquisition of missiles for Pak arsenal was Priority I requirement .
* Indigenous Pakistani missile development programme was Priority II. Or, at best , to proceed concurrently.
* The indigenous Pakistani missile development and production programme should not waste time on indigenous R&D. It should follow a dual-track path:
Track I
Assembly of imported missiles in Pakistan from what at best could be termed as SKDs (semi knocked down) kits and CKDs (completely knocked down) kits.
Track II
Indigenous fabrication of above missiles sub-systems and propellants in a graduated manner. Track I would enable a quantitative jump in indigenous Pakistan’s missile production expertise.
The above philosophy finds reflection in Pakistan’s missile arsenal, both in terms of composition and capabilities.
Pakistan’s Missile Arsenal: Composition and Capabilities
Pakistan’s missile arsenal when discussed in the media or in academic publications tends to get listed as one long list. Further, Pakistan’s deception measures in relation to its missile arsenal tends to confuse analysts by giving HATF serial numbers to subsequent developments. This is aimed at both for passing off latest acquisitions as indigenous and confounding analysts.
For a more orderly analysis of Pakistan’s missile arsenal and also in terms of range, propulsions systems and capabilities the Pakistani arsenal needs to be viewed in the following groupings:
* HATF series
* GHAURI series
* SHAHEEN series
* M-11
PAKISTAN'S MISSILE ARSENAL: Composition,Capabilities and Characteristics
HATF1 1989 80 500 Single Solid Indigenous O
HATF 1A 1992 100 500 Single Solid Indigenous O
HATF II 1989 300 500 Two Solid PRC (M11) D
HATF III 1997 600-800 500 Two Solid PRC D
GHAURI I 1998 1500 500-750 Single Liquid DPRK/PRC T
GHAURI II 1999 1500-2300 700 Two Liquid DPRK/PRC T
SHAHEEN I 1999 750 1000 Two Solid PRC (M 9) T
SHAHEEN II 2000 2500 1000 Two Solid PRC T
M-11 1991-1998 300 500-800 Two Solid PRC S
The groupings of Pakistani missile arsenal analysed thus also finds reflection in terms of distribution of development and fabrication within Pakistan, which is as follows:
Missile Series Propellant Pakistan Development/Fabrication Scientists
HATF Solid SUPARCO (Initially) Now likely NDC
GHAURI Liquid AQ Khan Research Lab Kahuta Dr. AQ Khan
SHAHEEN Solid PAEC National Defence Complex (NDC) Fathehganj Prof. Samar Mubarak Mund
In terms of analysis of missiles by ranges as per international classification standards the Pakistani missiles can be categorised as under:
* SRBM- HATF series, SHAHEEN 1 and M-11
* MRBM- GHAURI series
* IRBM - SHAHEEN II
Note: In terms of US classification system both GHAURI and SHAHEEN series are IRBMs
Thus Pakistan in a short span has been able to buildup its missile targeting capabilities to IRBM ranges.
Pakistani missile targeting strategies can be analysed from the following groupings in terms of ranges and characteristics. From a deductive analysis, the targeting strategy in terms of the different series appears to be as under. (See Map)
PAKISTAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE ARSENAL:
Development and Acquisition Philosophy.
The decade of the 1990s witnessed the dramatic emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation programme that had begun in 1960's because of the indian aquisition of weapons of mass destruction. It would have been logical to expect that a missile delivery programme for its nuclear weapons would be conducted concurrently. However, the outlines of an integrated Pakistani missile development plan began to appear only in the 1980s, though experimentation with sound ranging rockets had begun in the earlier decade.
Pakistan’s missile programme is termed as dramatic because in a short span commencing in 1991 this country has demonstrated the development of a long range potent missile arsenal with nuclear warhead capabilities.
Strategically, at the turn of the millennium, Pakistan can justifiably boast that not only has it offset India’s overwhelming conventional superiority by its nuclear weaponisation , but also has outstripped India’s missile development programmes which have proceeded slowly both due to domestic and external restraints.
Pakistan Missile Development /Acquisition Programme - The Stimulus
Multiple stimuli existed for Pakistan to go into over-drive for an accelerated missile development and acquisition programme. The decade of the 1990's could better be termed as a ‘Pakistan missile acquisition decade’ rather than a development one. There were more acquisitions than development.
Pakistan was impelled by the following stimuli, when contemporary developments are analysed:
* Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability by 1987, but its only means of delivery were aircraft, basically the US-F16s.
* United States embargo on F-16 deliveries as a result of Pressler Amendment rendered Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability vulnerable.
* Ballistic missiles had emerged as more potently destructive weapons and cost-effective options by 1990-91. This was evident from the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan and the Gulf War.
* China, by, now had emerged as a source of ready supply of ballistic missiles for the Islamic world.
* Pakistan’s strategic nexus with China enabled an easy and assured access for build-up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal as it was for Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation.
The stage was thus propitiously set for build -up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal. Unlike its struggle to acquire wherewithal for nuclear weapons production, Pakistan faced no problem in missile acquisition or production.
Pakistan’s Missile Development and Acquisition Philosophy
Strategically, Pakistan was aware that in terms of a missile build-up, it was running against time. Pakistan had nuclear weapons, but with aircraft delivery capability only. Aircraft had limitations both in terms of range of delivery of nuclear weapons and so also penetration of India’s air-defence systems. Pakistan was also sensitive to the indigenous development of India’s integrated missile development programme. India’s programme was slow but potent and threatening for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s missile build-up philosophy, therefore, differed markedly from India’s. Analysis of events, indicate that Pakistan’s missile build-up philosophy was grounded on the following guidelines:
* Speed was the uppermost imperative in terms of build-up of Pakistan’s missile arsenal
* Direct off- the- shelf acquisition of missiles for Pak arsenal was Priority I requirement .
* Indigenous Pakistani missile development programme was Priority II. Or, at best , to proceed concurrently.
* The indigenous Pakistani missile development and production programme should not waste time on indigenous R&D. It should follow a dual-track path:
Track I
Assembly of imported missiles in Pakistan from what at best could be termed as SKDs (semi knocked down) kits and CKDs (completely knocked down) kits.
Track II
Indigenous fabrication of above missiles sub-systems and propellants in a graduated manner. Track I would enable a quantitative jump in indigenous Pakistan’s missile production expertise.
The above philosophy finds reflection in Pakistan’s missile arsenal, both in terms of composition and capabilities.
Pakistan’s Missile Arsenal: Composition and Capabilities
Pakistan’s missile arsenal when discussed in the media or in academic publications tends to get listed as one long list. Further, Pakistan’s deception measures in relation to its missile arsenal tends to confuse analysts by giving HATF serial numbers to subsequent developments. This is aimed at both for passing off latest acquisitions as indigenous and confounding analysts.
For a more orderly analysis of Pakistan’s missile arsenal and also in terms of range, propulsions systems and capabilities the Pakistani arsenal needs to be viewed in the following groupings:
* HATF series
* GHAURI series
* SHAHEEN series
* M-11
PAKISTAN'S MISSILE ARSENAL: Composition,Capabilities and Characteristics
HATF1 1989 80 500 Single Solid Indigenous O
HATF 1A 1992 100 500 Single Solid Indigenous O
HATF II 1989 300 500 Two Solid PRC (M11) D
HATF III 1997 600-800 500 Two Solid PRC D
GHAURI I 1998 1500 500-750 Single Liquid DPRK/PRC T
GHAURI II 1999 1500-2300 700 Two Liquid DPRK/PRC T
SHAHEEN I 1999 750 1000 Two Solid PRC (M 9) T
SHAHEEN II 2000 2500 1000 Two Solid PRC T
M-11 1991-1998 300 500-800 Two Solid PRC S
The groupings of Pakistani missile arsenal analysed thus also finds reflection in terms of distribution of development and fabrication within Pakistan, which is as follows:
Missile Series Propellant Pakistan Development/Fabrication Scientists
HATF Solid SUPARCO (Initially) Now likely NDC
GHAURI Liquid AQ Khan Research Lab Kahuta Dr. AQ Khan
SHAHEEN Solid PAEC National Defence Complex (NDC) Fathehganj Prof. Samar Mubarak Mund
In terms of analysis of missiles by ranges as per international classification standards the Pakistani missiles can be categorised as under:
* SRBM- HATF series, SHAHEEN 1 and M-11
* MRBM- GHAURI series
* IRBM - SHAHEEN II
Note: In terms of US classification system both GHAURI and SHAHEEN series are IRBMs
Thus Pakistan in a short span has been able to buildup its missile targeting capabilities to IRBM ranges.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.CHRONOLOGY
HISTORY OF PAKISTAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
1960s
1965: Pakistani nuclear research reactor at Parr, Rawalpindi, starts functioning.
1968: Nonproliferation Treaty completed. Pakistan refuse to sign.
1970s
1974: India tests a device of up to 15 kilotons and calls the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.'' Pakistani Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells meeting of Pakistan's top scientists of intention to develop nuclear arms.
1974 -- Pakistan proposed to India the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in south Asia
1978 -- Pakistan proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons
1979 -- The United States cut off aid to Pakistan under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA) after it was learned that Pakistan had secretly begun construction of a uranium enrichment facility.
1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities
1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan
1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards
1980s
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China.
1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).
1981
1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.'
1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.
1982
1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').
1983--Declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.'
1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but peaceful purposes.'
1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.
1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.
1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).
1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.
1985 -- Pressler Amendment [section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act] requires a total cut-off of U.S. aid to Islamabad unless the president can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon, and that continued US aid will significantly decrease the probability of its developing one in the future.
1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.
1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade material.
1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'
1986--Declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'
1987 -- Pakistan proposed to India an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty
1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).
1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan.
1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan states in published interview that `what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'
1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.
1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).
1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'
1987 -- China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers.
1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification, he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'
1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.
1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability `that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'
1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.
1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.
1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear capability.'
1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid
1980's.
1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.
1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.
1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiques to the West German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.
1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'
1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'
1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.
1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'
1990
1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafeguard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.
Spring 1990 -- Pakistan reportedly reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. [02 December 1992 NBC News report]
1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.
1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.
1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.
1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed `model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.
1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons technology.'
1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'
1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and missile applications.
October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.
1991 -- Pakistan proposed to India commencement of a multilateral conference on the nuclear proliferation in south Asia
1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.
1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan warheads. And they've still got them.'
1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.'
1991--India and Pakistan enter agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.
July 1991 - Reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.
1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.
Late 1992 -- The US Government determines that China had transferred items controlled under the international Missile Technology Control Regime to Pakistan.
December 1992 -- The US Government asked Pakistan to return eight US Navy frigates and a supply ship that had been leased to the Pakistan Navy, which accounted for more than half of Pakistan's major surface combatants.
01 December 1992 -- Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours [Dec. 1, 1992 NBC News broadcast].
1993 -- Pakistan proposed to India creation of a missile-free zone in south Asia
25 August 1993 -- The United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law.
Late 1993 -- The Clinton Administration, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded to Pakistan and India over their respective nuclear programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain "country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued that by the time nuclear nonproliferation provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States sanctions.
Early 1994 -- The Clinton Administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment because of strong criticism from a number of influential members of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself.
April 1994 - Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Islamabad to propose a one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. Talbott states that there is "broad agreement" between the United States and Pakistan on the goal of "first capping, then reducing, and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia."
April 1995 -- Prime Minister Bhutto visits Washington.
September 1995 -- The Clinton Administration proposes revisions to the Pressler Amendment, citing the Amendment's roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. Under the Brown Amendment, the US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan.
01 January 1996 -- India and Pakistan exchange lists of atomic installations which each side has pledged not to attack under an over seven-year-old confidence-building agreement.
January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permited limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.
March 1996 -- Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Late 1996 -- Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, the A.Q. Khan Laboratory in Kahuta, purchased 5,000 ring magnets from China. The ring magnets would allow Pakistan to effectively double its capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons production.
03 October 1996 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for the convening of a South Asia security conference that would deal with, among other things, Kashmir and the nuclear arms issue.
04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.
06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons saying that: "Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."
28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).
1960s
1965: Pakistani nuclear research reactor at Parr, Rawalpindi, starts functioning.
1968: Nonproliferation Treaty completed. Pakistan refuse to sign.
1970s
1974: India tests a device of up to 15 kilotons and calls the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.'' Pakistani Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells meeting of Pakistan's top scientists of intention to develop nuclear arms.
1974 -- Pakistan proposed to India the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in south Asia
1978 -- Pakistan proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons
1979 -- The United States cut off aid to Pakistan under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA) after it was learned that Pakistan had secretly begun construction of a uranium enrichment facility.
1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities
1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan
1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards
1980s
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.
Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China.
1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).
1981
1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.'
1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.
1982
1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').
1983--Declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.'
1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but peaceful purposes.'
1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.
1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.
1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).
1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.
1985 -- Pressler Amendment [section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act] requires a total cut-off of U.S. aid to Islamabad unless the president can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon, and that continued US aid will significantly decrease the probability of its developing one in the future.
1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.
1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade material.
1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'
1986--Declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'
1987 -- Pakistan proposed to India an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty
1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).
1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan.
1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan states in published interview that `what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'
1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.
1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).
1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'
1987 -- China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers.
1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification, he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'
1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.
1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability `that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'
1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.
1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.
1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear capability.'
1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid
1980's.
1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.
1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.
1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiques to the West German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.
1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'
1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'
1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.
1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'
1990
1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafeguard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.
Spring 1990 -- Pakistan reportedly reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. [02 December 1992 NBC News report]
1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.
1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.
1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.
1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed `model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.
1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons technology.'
1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'
1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and missile applications.
October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.
1991 -- Pakistan proposed to India commencement of a multilateral conference on the nuclear proliferation in south Asia
1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.
1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan warheads. And they've still got them.'
1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.'
1991--India and Pakistan enter agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.
July 1991 - Reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.
1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.
Late 1992 -- The US Government determines that China had transferred items controlled under the international Missile Technology Control Regime to Pakistan.
December 1992 -- The US Government asked Pakistan to return eight US Navy frigates and a supply ship that had been leased to the Pakistan Navy, which accounted for more than half of Pakistan's major surface combatants.
01 December 1992 -- Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours [Dec. 1, 1992 NBC News broadcast].
1993 -- Pakistan proposed to India creation of a missile-free zone in south Asia
25 August 1993 -- The United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law.
Late 1993 -- The Clinton Administration, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded to Pakistan and India over their respective nuclear programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain "country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued that by the time nuclear nonproliferation provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States sanctions.
Early 1994 -- The Clinton Administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment because of strong criticism from a number of influential members of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself.
April 1994 - Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Islamabad to propose a one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. Talbott states that there is "broad agreement" between the United States and Pakistan on the goal of "first capping, then reducing, and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia."
April 1995 -- Prime Minister Bhutto visits Washington.
September 1995 -- The Clinton Administration proposes revisions to the Pressler Amendment, citing the Amendment's roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. Under the Brown Amendment, the US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan.
01 January 1996 -- India and Pakistan exchange lists of atomic installations which each side has pledged not to attack under an over seven-year-old confidence-building agreement.
January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permited limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.
March 1996 -- Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Late 1996 -- Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, the A.Q. Khan Laboratory in Kahuta, purchased 5,000 ring magnets from China. The ring magnets would allow Pakistan to effectively double its capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons production.
03 October 1996 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for the convening of a South Asia security conference that would deal with, among other things, Kashmir and the nuclear arms issue.
04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.
06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons saying that: "Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."
28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).
30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warheads, with a yield of 12 kilotons, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six.
PAKISTAN, THE FIRST MUSLIM NUCLEAR POWER
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons
A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was
Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources,
and later became President and Prime Minister.
Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971
war with India, Bhutto initiated the program
with a meeting of physicists and engineers at
Multan in January 1972.
India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was
established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources,
and later became President and Prime Minister.
Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971
war with India, Bhutto initiated the program
with a meeting of physicists and engineers at
Multan in January 1972.
India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
Thursday, June 10, 2010
PAKISTAN,S MILITARY
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Army (includes National Guard),   Navy (includes Marines and Maritime Security Agency) Pakistan Air Force (Pakistan Fiza'ya) (2010) | |
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17-23 years of age for voluntary military service soldiers cannot be deployed for combat until age 18 the Pakistani Air Force and Pakistani Navy have inducted their first female pilots and sailors (2009) | |
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males age 16-49: 45,829,360 females age 16-49: 41,716,682 (2010 est.) | |
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males age 16-49: 35,774,936 females age 16-49: 34,572,451 (2010 est.) | |
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male: 2,144,574 female: 2,000,479 (2010 est.) | |
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3% of GDP (2007 est.) country comparison to the world: 47 | |
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PAKISTAN IN THE WORLD MAP
Southern Asia, bordering the Arabian Sea, between India on the east and Iran and Afghanistan on the west and China in the north. | |
30 00 N, 70 00 E | |
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Area: | |
total: 796,095 sq km country comparison to the world: 36land: 770,875 sq km water: 25,220 sq km | |
slightly less than twice the size of California | |
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total: 6,774 km border countries: Afghanistan 2,430 km, China 523 km,India 2,912 km, Iran 909 km | |
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1,046 km | |
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territorial sea: 12 nm contiguous zone: 24 nm exclusive economic zone: 200 nm continental shelf: 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin | |
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| Current Weather mostly hot, dry desert; temperate in northwest; arctic in north | |
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flat Indus plain in east; mountains in north and northwest; Balochistan plateau in west | |
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lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m highest point: K2 (Mt. Godwin-Austen) 8,611 m | |
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land, extensive natural gas reserves, limited petroleum, good quality coal, iron ore, copper, salt, limestone,gold | |
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arable land: 24.44% permanent crops: 0.84% other: 74.72% (2005) | |
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182,300 sq km (2003) | |
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233.8 cu km (2003) | |
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total: 169.39 cu km/yr (2%/2%/96%) per capita: 1,072 cu m/yr (2000) | |
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frequent earthquakes, occasionally severe especially in north and west ; flooding along the Indus after heavy rains (July and August) | |
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water pollution from raw sewage, industrial wastes, and agricultural runoff; poor performance of the leaders have made the hardworking people suffer. | |
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party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Wetlands Marine Life Conservation | |
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controls Khyber Pass and Bolan Pass, traditional invasion routes between Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. | |
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